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Abstract 
The main purpose of this research is to study the impact of corporate governance on the financial 
performance of the banking sector in Kosovo. To analyze this impact, the Pearson correlation 
coefficient, multiple regression analysis related to the board size and board independence and banking 
sector performance in Kosovo were applied. The key corporate governance variables that have been 
studied in this research are: (i) size of the board of directors, (ii) the independence of the board of 
directors (the ratio between non-executive directors and the total number of board members). The data 
for this research were collected from the annual reports and audited financial statements of commercial 
banks in Kosovo for the 12 year period (2006-2017) and from questionnaires addressed to board 
members of commercial banks in Kosovo as well as other publications from relevant local institutions 
such as the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK), Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK), Tax Administration of 
Kosovo (TAK), etc. The results of the multiple regression analysis regarding the influence of the board 
of directors on the financial performance of the banking sector indicate that: the size of the board of 
directors and the independence of the board of directors have a positive and significant impact on the 
financial performance of the banking sector in Kosovo, expressed through return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE). Findings of this research are in line with the findings of other researchers in 
this field and confirm the assertion that the management of the above variables improves and has a 
positive impact on the financial performance of banks in Kosovo. 
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1 This research paper is part of my PhD thesis “Corporate Governance and Internal Auditing as a Performance 
Function of Banking Sector in Kosovo”. 
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Introduction  
Successful corporate governance in banks is one of the key factors affecting the overall performance of 
banks. Due to the lack of many research studies of the banking sector in transition countries such as Kosovo 
(Uwuigbe, 2011) and a rather new banking sector in Kosovo, this research claims to bridge the gap in existing 
corporate governance literature in the banking sector. According to the authors Heidi and Marleen, banking 
supervision cannot function properly if banks fail to implement a proper and effective corporate governance 
framework (Heidi & Marleen, 2003). Therefore, the main motivation of this research is the claim to analyze 
and study the relationship between corporate governance variables and financial performance of the banking 
sector in Kosovo. 
To analyze these relationships, among others, the Pearson correlation coefficient, and regression analysis 
will be applied in relation to corporate governance variables and banking sector performance. The key 
variables of corporate governance will be (i) the size of the board of directors and (ii) the independence of 
the board of directors (the ratio between non-executive directors2  and the total number of board members). 
Corporate Governance has been partially developed as a response to the agency's problem, in order to 
respond to the difficulties in making sure that the entity's shareholders are able to exercise sufficient control 
over their agents, directors and managers. Corporate governance is a system under which banks are directed 
and controlled (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992). Corporate Governance is a set of relationships between 
directors, shareholders and other stakeholders of a company. At the same time it sets out the structure by 
which the banks objectives are set and the way in which the achievement of these objectives and the 
performance monitoring are determined (OECD Principles, 2015).  
A study by McKinsey in relation to corporate governance in 2008, suggests that investors are prepared to 
pay an additional premium to buy shares of companies which have enhanced corporate governance 
systems (McKinsey, 2008). Some of the important indicators of good corporate governance for investors 
are the fact that the board had a majority of independent non - executive directors, the fact that the directors 
owned a significant share of the shares and that the compensation was based on shares, the fact that the 
performance of board directors was made by formalized methods and providing good and timely responses 
to shareholders' information requests. The key participants in corporate governance are: Board of 
Directors, Management and Shareholders (Aebi, Sabato, Schmid, 2012). 
Just as in all corporations and banks, corporate governance plays an essential role. Given the specificities 
of the bank's operations, the general principles of good governance cannot be applied to all banks. Macey 
& O'Hara argue that banks are quite specific in their organizational structure, so their corporate governance 
needs to be looked at differently (O’Hara, 2003). Banks are organized in different ways. Banks' assets are 
more specific, which makes them more difficult for their owners to monitor their banking activities. Banks 
are also subject to strict regulation by central banks due to deposit holdings, which has important 
implications for risk taking by bank managers and the moral hazard problem by banks. Another reason for 
banks to be treated differently is the role of stakeholder groups, such as depositors, debtors and regulators. 
The weak and ineffective mechanisms of corporate governance in banks have been highlighted as the 
main factors contributing to the recent financial crisis. Deep changes in this area are needed to strengthen 
the stability of the financial sector (Marcinkowska, 2012) .The failure of a bank to pursue good practices in 
corporate governance and the lack of effective governance are among the most important internal factors 
that could endanger a bank's liquidity and solvency. 
Corporate governance in the banking sector is important because this sector plays an essential role in the 
health and economic performance of a country (Saidi, 2004). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCSB), in its report on enhancing corporate governance in the banking sector, stressed that corporate 
governance in banks is essential for the international financial system and is needed to guarantee a sound 
																																								 																				
2 Note: executive directors are also known as internal directors, while non-executive directors are also known as 
external or independent directors. 
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financial system and development of sustainable economy of a country (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2006). 
Literature review 
This part deals with the literature review in the area of corporate governance related to the topic of this 
research. 
One of the big four audit firms "Deloitte" in collaboration with Nyenrode Business University has conducted 
a meta-analysis of scientific papers published during 2006-2016 on the impact of various corporate 
governance variables on entity performance (Deloitte, Neynrode Business University, 2016). The research finds 
the presence of correlation between several corporate governance variables and entity performance. Some 
of the corporate governance variables with a correlation effect are specified to be: (i) the independence of 
the board of directors, (ii) the diversity of the board of directors; (iii) Compensation; (iv) the characteristics of 
the Executive Director (CEO); (v) oversight, and (vi) ownership structure. The following table presents the 
variables of corporate governance and their impact or performance effect based on this research. 
 
Table 1: Corporate governance variables and their impact on performance 
 
Variables Impact on performance 
Board independence A greater number of independent board members have an impact on 
improving the board's objectivity and its ability to present some views on 
various issues. However, with the increased size of the board, this may 
have an impact on the slowdown in the decision-making process. 
Diversity of the board Demographic diversity has a positive impact on performance. However, 
when diversity is mandated by law, this effect is not present. 
Compensation Compensation contributes to performance by coordinating shareholders' 
and management interests. Stock options for the CEO may work well in 
good times, but may not be effective when the firm's performance is 
stagnating. 
CEO characteristics If the CEO has a strong position, this has a positive effect on 
performance, but can lead to more risk-based decision-making.  
Oversight The active supervisory role of owners and boards has a positive effect on 
performance, especially in international companies. 
Ownership structure Institutional ownership has a positive impact on the quality of strategic 
decisions made by the board, engaging actively and having a prospective 
outlook. 
Source: Deloitte (Deloitte, Neynrode Business University, 2016). 
 
Authors Belhaj and Mateus researched the effect of corporate governance on financial performance on 
eleven (11) European banks. The variables tested in this research paper were board size, board composition 
(independence), gender diversity and the CEO duality during 10-year period (2002-2011). The results show 
that the board size and board gender diversity have a significant positive effect on bank performance. They 
found out that banks with larger number of board members and more female members had better financial 
performance. They also concluded that board composition (executive vs. non-executive) and CEO duality 
had no significant impact on the performance of the sampled European banks (Belhaj & Mateus, 2016). 
Authors Isik & Ince (2016) have reviewed the impact of two key corporate governance variables, board size 
and board composition, on commercial banks in Turkey during a time-span of 5 years (2008-2012). They 
also used control variables such as bank size, credit risk, liquidity risk and net interest margin to account for 
any effect on bank performance by these variables. Empirical results show that board size have a significant 
and positive impact on bank performance, while the board composition (inside vs. outside directors) does 
not have any effect on bank performance (Isik & Ince, 2016). 
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Through a very large longitudinal study, and a 40 years period covered (1959-1999), authors Adams and 
Mehran (2008) have analyzed weather board size and its composition have impact on Tobin’s Q (financial 
indicator) of banking firms in USA. They concluded that larger boards do not have lower financial performance 
than other banks in terms of Tobin’s Q (financial indicator). Setting limits on board sized may be non-
productive (Adams & Mehran, 2008). 
Table 2 shows the empirical research of various authors who have tested hypotheses on the impact of 
corporate governance on the financial performance of banks in different countries of the world. All the works 
listed in the following table have applied econometric models to quantify the effect of independent variables 
(the characteristics of the board of directors) on the dependent variables (financial performance of banks). In 
the table we have presented the data on the authors, the location of the researched banks, the time period 
of research, the test variables and the test results. 
 
Table 2: Summary of empirical studies related to impact of corporate governance 
 in bank performance 
 
# 
 
Authors 
Country and 
Period 
Covered 
 
Variables tested 
 
 
Test results 
(positive, negative or 
mixed)3 
1 Salma Belhaj & Cesario 
Mateus 
Europe, 
 2002-2011 
ROA, ROE, Tobins-Q 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Gender diversity 
CEO Duality 
Banks Size 
Financial leverage 
Liquidity 
 
Positive 
Positive 
Mixed 
Positive 
Negative 
Negative 
Negative 
2  Ozcan Isik &  
 Ali Riza Ince 
Turkey, 
2008-2012 
ROA 
Board Size 
Board Composition 
Banks Size 
Credit Crisk 
Net Interest Margin 
Other income 
 
Positive 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
3 Ekadah, John Wachudi 
& Josphat Mboya 
Kenya, 
1998-2009 
ROA 
Gender diversity i bordit 
Credit Crisk 
 
Negative 
Negative 
4 Renée B. Adams 
Hamid Mehran 
USA, 
1959-1999 
Tobin’s-Q 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
 
Positive 
Negative 
5 Mesut Doğan & Feyyaz 
YILDIZ 
Turkey, 
2005-2010 
ROA, ROE, Tobin’s-Q 
Board Size 
 
Negative 
6 • Rim Boussaada & Majdi 
Karmani     
North 
America, 
2004-2011 
ROA 
Board Size 
Foreign Directors 
 
Negative 
Positive 
7 
Ahmed Al-Baidhani 
 
Qatar & UAE,  
2014-2017 
ROA, ROE 
Board Size 
Bank Age 
 
Negative 
Positive 
																																								 																				
3 Note: 'Positive' implies that the variable has an increasing effect on the banks' financial performance, 'negative' implies 
that the variable has an opposite effect, whereas the 'mixed' effect implies that the variable may affect a period positively 
analyzed, while in the other periods negatively. 
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Board Independence Negative 
8 Ashenafi Beyene 
Fanta, Kelifa Srmolo 
Kemal & Yodit Kassa 
Waka 
Ethiopia, 
2005-2011 
ROA, ROE 
Board Size 
Audit Committee 
Banks Size 
Capital Adequacy 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Positive 
Positive 
9 Adel Bino & Shorouq 
Tomar 
Aman, 
1996-2006 
ROA, ROE 
Board Size 
Ownership Structure 
Board Composition 
 
Positive 
Positive 
Negative 
10 Maria-Eleni Agoraki & 
Manthos D Delis & 
Panagiotis Staikouras 
EU, 
2002-2006 
Cost/Profit 
Board Size 
Board Composition 
 
Negative 
Positive 
11 Pablo de Andres & 
Eleuterio Vallelado 
Canada, USA, 
England, 
1995-2005 
Tobin’s-Q, ROA 
Board Size 
Board Composition 
 
Positive 
Positive 
12 Ilduara 
Busta  & Bersant 
Hobdari  
France, 
Germany, 
Italy, Spain 
and Great 
Britain  
ROA, ROE 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Banks Size 
 
 
Positive 
Positive 
No effect 
13 Bowo Setiyonoa1 & 
Amine Tarazia 
Indonesia 
2001-2011 
ROA, ROE 
Gender Diversity of the Board 
Ethnic Diversity of the Board 
Professional Diversity of the 
Board 
Educational Diversity of the 
Board 
 
No effect 
 
Negative 
Positive 
 
Positive 
14 Emma García-Meca & 
Isabel-María García-
Sánchez & Jennifer  
Martínez-Ferrero 
EU 
2004-2010 
ROA, ROE 
Gender Diversity 
National Diversity 
 
Positive 
Negative 
15 Shams Pathan & 
Robert Faff 
USA, 
1997-2011 
ROA, ROE 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Gender Diversity 
 
Negative 
Negative 
Mixed 
16  
Sungho Choi  
&  
Iftekhar Hasan 
 
Korea, 
1998-2002 
ROE, ROA 
Foreign Investors Presence 
Board Nationality 
 
Positive 
Positive 
17 Tanna, S. ,  
Pasiouras, F.  
& Nnadi, M 
England, 
2001-2006 
Bank Efficiency 
Board Size 
Board Composition 
 
Positive 
Positive 
 
From the literature review, it has been noted that research on corporate governance in banks is more focused 
on developed countries where the capital market is quite efficient (Cohern & Pharell, 2009, Mconnel, Servaes 
and Lins, 2008). There is little such research on transition countries, as is the case in Kosovo. Some 
corporate governance research in banking industry has focused only on a single aspect of corporate 
governance, such as the role of the board of directors or shareholders, without analyzing other factors and 
interactions that may be important within corporate governance framework. For example, only one research 
was conducted in 2009 by the RIINVEST Institute in Kosovo, which mainly elaborates on the existing state 
Hoti and Dermaku / International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Vol 7 No 3, 2018 
  ISSN: 2147-4486 
Peer-reviewed Academic Journal published by SSBFNET with respect to copyright holders. 
	
Page25	
of corporate governance of the banking and insurance sector, but does not go on to show its impact on the 
banking sector performance (RIINVEST, 2009).  
 
Therefore, to close as much as possible the knowledge gap on corporate governance of the banking sector 
in transition countries, this research will focus on the analysis of the impact of these concepts on the 
performance of the banking sector in Kosovo. The focus is on the banking industry because the problems of 
corporate governance are important in the banking sector as a result of the special role that this sector has 
in providing loans to natural and legal persons of the economy and maintaining the stability of the banking 
sector and its impact on economy as a whole. 
 
Research and Methodology 
Concerning the testing of the hypotheses of this research, these forms of data analysis will be applied: 
a) Correlation analysis - to analyze the relationship or correlation between dependent variables and 
independent variables (explanatory variables) - the correlation testing between them will also be 
performed. 
b) Descriptive statistics - from the summarized data the analysis of the mean, mode, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, which provide information about the overall tendency of the explanatory and 
dependent variables. 
d) Panel data4 regression analysis - which includes panel data analysis technique, where data is 
analyzed both from time perspective and from the aspect of different banks (longitudinal study). 
 
The population of this research consists of banks operating in Kosovo. Therefore, a benchmark sample 
includes all commercial banks operating in Kosovo for at least 12 consecutive years (2006-2017) so that the 
variables of corporate governance and those of financial performance can be comparable over the years. 
 
The data for this research will be gathered directly from (i) audited annual financial reports of banks operating 
in Kosovo (secondary data), and (ii) through a questionnaire that is designed in accordance with the elements 
of the problem discussed in this research (primary data). 
 
Based on the research objectives listed in the introductory section, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
 
H1) H0: There is no significant positive relationship between the size of the board of directors and the 
performance of banks in Kosovo. 
 
H2) H0: There is no significant positive relationship between the independence of the board of directors and 
the performance of banks in Kosovo. 
 
To test the hypothesis this research uses fixed effect multiple regression panel data model which is divided 
into two main groups, those which, as a bank performance indicator have (ROA) and those which have the 
return on equity (ROE). In order to measure the specific impact of each of the above listed corporate 
governance indicators, specific models are developed below, each of which have an independent variable 
and other control variables. 
 
Group 1 (ROA – dependent variable) 
Model 1a: ROAi,t = β0 + β1MBDi,t + β2MBi,t + β3RRKi,t + β4Di,t + β5RRLi,t + ᶓi,t 
Model 2a: ROAi,t = β0 + β1PABDi,t + β2MBi,t + β3RRKi,t + β4Di,t + β5RRLi,t + ᶓi,t 
 
Group 2 (ROE – dependent variable) 
Model 1b: ROEi,t = β0 + β1MBDi,t + β2MBi,t + β3RRKi,t + β4Di,t + β5RRLi,t + ᶓi,t 
																																								 																				
4 In statistics and econometrics, the term 'panel data' refers to multi-dimensional data which mainly includes their 
evaluation over a period of time. 
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Model 2b: ROEi,t = β0 + β1PABDi,t + β2MBi,t + β3RRKi,t + β4Di,t + β5RRLi,t + ᶓi,t 
 
Table 3: Summary of research variables and the basis for their measurement  
Variables Acronym Basis for measurement 
1. Depended variables (performance measurement indicators): 
Return on Assets ROA Net income divided by total assets at the end of each accounting 
year. 
Return on Equity ROE Net income divided by total equity at the end of each accounting 
year. 
2. Independent variables (board of directors characteristics): 
Board of Directors 
Size 
MBD Expressed as a natural logarithm of total number of board of 
directors for each accounting year. 
Board of Directors 
Independence 
PABD The ratio between the number of non-executive directors to the 
total number of board directors for each accounting year subject 
to this research. 
3. Control variables: 
Bank Size MB Expressed as a natural logarithm of the total balance of bank 
assets at the balance sheet date (statement of financial position) 
for each accounting year. 
 
Credit Risk RRK Expressed as the ratio between loan loss provision to total gross 
loans for each accounting year. 
 
Deposits D Expressed as a natural logarithm of total deposits for each 
accounting year. 
 
Liquidity Risk RRL Expressed as a ratio of gross loans and the total of deposits for 
each accounting year. 
 
Findings 
The two dependent variables (bank performance indicators) used in this research are Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). Based on the results of the descriptive statistics presented in table 4 we 
can conclude that during the 12 year period (2006-2017), commercial banks in Kosovo have recorded an 
average ROA of 1.4% (0.014) and an average ROE of 12.8% (0.128). This means that on average, the 
banks, for every 1 euro of their total assets, have realized a net profit of 0.014 EURO, while for every 1 euro 
of their total equity, they realized net profit of 0.128 EURO. The maximum ROA over the same period was 
8.7% (0.087), while the minimum ROA was -4% (-0.040). Meanwhile, the maximum ROE was 50% (0.500), 
while the minimum ROE was -28.3% (-0.283). Also, based on the standard deviation of 9.6% (0.096) for ROA 
and 12.5% (0.125) for ROE, we can conclude that the performance of banks in Kosovo has had a large 
variation range in ROA and ROE values from positive to negative ones. 
 
Table 4 presents two independent explanatory variables of the impact of the board of directors on the financial 
performance of banks in Kosovo. Based on the results of the explanatory statistics of these variables we can 
ascertain the following: 
(i) The Board of Directors Size (MBD) varies from maximum 8 to minimum 4, with an average of 5 and a 
standard deviation of 1.52. This implies that during the reviewed period 2006-2017, the maximum number 
of board members in a commercial bank in Kosovo was 8, while the minimum number was 4, with an 
average of 5 members. 
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(ii) The Board of Directors Independence (PABD) varies from a maximum of 60% (0.60) to a minimum 
of 33.3% (0.333), with an average of 50.2% (0.502) and a standard deviation of 7.9% (0.79). This implies 
that during the reviewed period 2006-2017, the maximum percentage of non-executive members of the 
board of directors in commercial banks in Kosovo was 60%, while the minimum percentage was 33.3%, 
with an average of 50.2%. Thus, almost half of the members of the Board of Directors of commercial 
banks in Kosovo are non-executive (external and independent from the management of the bank) while 
the other half are internal directors (executive). The standard deviation of 7.9% indicates an average 
variation of the values of this variable in commercial banks in Kosovo. 
 
Table 4 presents four explanatory control variables of the impact of other factors on the financial performance 
of banks in Kosovo. Based on the results of the explanatory statistics of these control variables we can 
ascertain the following:  
(i) The size of banks (MB) ranges from the maximum value of 900,919 to the minimum value of 8,941, 
with an average of 356,284 and a standard deviation of 260,460. This implies that during the reviewed 
period 2006-2017, the highest value of total assets of a bank was 900,919,000 EURO, while the lowest 
was 356,284,000 EURO, with an average of EUR 356,284.00. Thus, the average total assets of the 
banking sector in Kosovo are 356,284,000 EURO. The standard deviation of EUR 260,460,000 shows a 
high variation among commercial banks in Kosovo, as regards to their total assets in the statement of 
financial position (balance sheet).  
(ii) Credit Risk (RRK) varies from the maximum value of 10.8% (0.108) to the minimum value of 1.1% 
(0.011), with an average of 4.9% (0.049) and standard deviation 2.5% (0.025). This implies that during 
the reviewed period 2006-2017, the maximum percentage of suspicious credit reserves was 10.8%, while 
the minimum percentage was 1.1%, while the average was 4.9%. So, almost all commercial banks in 
Kosovo had a credit risk of 4.9%, which is the lowest level in the region. The standard deviation of 2.5% 
shows a very low variation of credit risk in commercial banks in Kosovo that may be due to a conservative 
credit policy. 
(iii) Bank Deposits (D) range from a maximum of 735,790 to a minimum 4,022, an average of 301,417 
and a standard deviation of 217,529. This implies that during the reviewed period 2006-2017, the highest 
total deposits in a bank were 735,790,000 EURO, while the lowest was 4,022,000 EURO, with an 
average of 301,417.00 EURO. Thus, the average total of deposits of the banking sector in Kosovo was 
301,417,000 EURO. The standard deviation of EUR 217,529,000 shows a high variation among 
commercial banks in Kosovo, as regards to their total deposits in the statement of financial position 
(balance sheet).  
(iv) The liquidity risk (RRL) varies from a maximum of 241% (2,410) to a minimum 50.4% (0.504), an 
average of 81.2% (0.812) and a standard deviation of 28.9% (0.289). This implies that during the 
reviewed period 2006-2017 the maximum percentage of gross loans to deposits was 241%, while the 
minimum percentage was 50.4%, with an average of 81.2%. So, almost all commercial banks in Kosovo 
had a liquidity risk of 81%, which is of average level, since 20% of deposits have been held as a reserve. 
The standard deviation of 28.9% indicates a very high variation of liquidity risk among commercial banks 
in Kosovo.  
 
Below is presented the table number 4 which includes a summary of descriptive statistics of the banking 
sector in Kosovo, during the research period 2006-2017. 
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Table 4: Summary of descriptive statistics of commercial banks in Kosovo for the period 2006-2017 
Variable # Observations Minimum Maximum Average St. Deviation 
1. Depended variables (performance measurement indicators): 
ROA 84 (0.040) 0.087 0.014 0.096 
ROE 84 (0.283) 0.500 0.128 0.125 
2. Independent variables (board of directors characteristics): 
MBD 84 4.000 8.000 5.000 1.521 
PABD 84 0.333 0.600 0.502 0.079 
3. Control variables: 
MB5 84 8,941 900,919 356,284 260,460 
RRK 84 0.011 0.108 0.049 0.025 
D6 84 4,022 735,790 301,417 217,529 
RRL 84 0.504 2.410 0.812 0.289 
Total observations:    1260  
Source: author (XLSTAT) 
 
Correlation analysis allows to empirically verify the presence or not of the relationship between the two factors 
(variables). This method of analysis does not indicate the level of influence (significance) of a variable to 
another, but only expresses the existence or not of a relationship or correlation. 
 
Table 5 presents a correlation results in the form of a matrix showing correlation coefficients along with the 
significance level for each dependent, independent, and control variable. As can be seen from the results, in 
almost all coefficients of correlation of independent or control variables the value does not exceed 0.90 
(r≤0.90), which means that the presence of multicollinearity is not a problem, except for the correlation 
coefficient between deposit (D) and total assets (MB) which is 0.99, which is expected, as deposits have a 
direct impact on the total assets of a bank.  
 
Based on the results presented in this table we can conclude the following: 
(i) Dependent variables, ROA and ROE, have a positive correlation coefficient with all independent 
variables, respectively with independent variables of the board of directors (MBD, PABD). Almost all 
correlation coefficients have a high level of significance (credibility) equal to 95% (p≤0.05), respectively 
99% (p≤0.01). Positive correlation coefficients imply that, with the increase in the values of the board of 
directors variables have an increasing impact on the financial performance of banks (ROA and ROE).  
These findings are consistent with the findings of the research by performed by Ondieki (2012), Bett 
(2014), Ozcan (2016), Salma (2016), Matari (2013), Pablo (2008). 
(ii) Dependent variables, ROA and ROE, have positive correlation coefficients with control variables such 
as (i) size of banks (MB), (ii) credit risk (RRK) and (iii) deposits (D) of 5% (p≤0.05), and 1% (p≤0.01), 
while the negative correlation with the liquidity risk (RRL). This implies that by increasing the size of 
banks, credit risk and bank deposits, there will be an increase in bank financial performance, expressed 
through ROA and ROE, while with increased liquidity risk there will be a decrease in banks' financial 
performance (negative impact). This finding is in line with the research findings of the authors Stanisic 
(2016) dhe Ozcan (2016). These findings also confirm the theory that the larger the bank, the more it will 
have loans and other placements in its total assets, which result in net profit growth. Also, the more 
deposits the bank has, the more it can put them in the form of loans and this can bring higher net profits. 
However, the strongest and most significant correlation between the bank's control and performance 
variables (ROA and ROE) is in the variables of banks' size (r = 0.42 and r = 0.48) and deposits (r = 0.42 
and r = 0.43). On the other hand, liquidity risk has a weak negative correlation (r = -0.21 and r = -0.14) 
with ROA and ROE and not quite significant (p = 0.05 and p = 0.19). Credit risk (RRK) also has a weak 
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positive correlation (r = 0.27 and r = 0.10) with ROA and ROE and not quite significant (p = 0.01 and p = 
0.35). 
Table 5: Correlation matrix summary 
Variables ROA ROE MBD PABD MB RRK DE RRL 
ROA Pearson (r)  1.00         
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00         
ROE Pearson (r)  0.90 1.00        
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00 0.00        
MBD Pearson (r)  0.5** 0.57** 1.00       
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00       
PABD Pearson (r)  029** 0.42** 0.58** 1.00      
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00      
MB Pearson (r)  0.42** 0.48** 0.19 0.12 1.00     
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.00     
RRK Pearson (r)  0.27** 0.10 0.09 -0.07 0.21* 1.00    
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.01 0.35 0.40 0.49 0.04 0.00    
DE Pearson (r)  0.42** 0.43** 0.19 0.11 0.99 0.22* 1.00   
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.00 0.03 0.00   
RRL Pearson (r)  -0.21 -0.14 0.01 0.06 -0.24 -0.37 -0.26 1.00 
  Sig. (2-tail) 0.05 0.19 0.92 0.56 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Source: author (XLSTAT); *0.05 (5%), **0.01 (1%).  
 
To better derive the impact of the board of directors 'variables on banks' financial performance (ROA and 
ROE), and to eliminate the deficiencies of the two previous analysis (descriptive and correlation), the 
following section applies the fixed effect multiple regression analysis of panel data which will show the precise 
impact of independent and control variables on the financial performance of banks in Kosovo during 2006-
2017 time period. This analysis is categorized as 'multivariate analysis'. 
 
In table 6 we have presented fixed effect (FE) multiple regression results of panel data for all models of this 
research, with ROA and ROE as a dependent variable. Each model aims to derive the individual effect of 
each variable of the board of directors on the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo, while at 
the same time for all models the effect of control variables is also taken into account.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant positive relationship between the size of the board of directors 
and the performance of banks in Kosovo 
 
This hypothesis is tested by model 1a and model 1b specified in the econometric section. Model 1a is used 
to test the impact of the size of the board of directors on the financial performance of commercial banks in 
Kosovo over the period 2006-2017 expressed through ROA, while model 1b is used to test the same impact 
but through ROE as a dependent variable. 
 
The regression results presented in table 6 show a significant and positive impact between the size of the 
Board of Directors (MBD) and the financial performance of commercial banks in Kosovo expressed through 
ROA and ROE as dependent variable. According to model 1a, which applies ROA as a performance metric, 
the regression coefficient is r = 0.0047 with a confidence level (significance) of p = 0.0000 (p≤1%). Also, 
according to model 1b, which applies ROE as performance metric the regression coefficient is r = 0.03867 
with a confidence level of p = 0.0000 (p≤1%). This implies that the size of the board of directors has a 
significant positive impact on the ROA and ROE of commercial banks in Kosovo, and that an increase in the 
size of the board would have an increasing impact on the financial performance of banks, respectively, in the 
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growth of ROA and ROE. This result rejects the zero hypotheses (H0), where it is foreseen that there is no 
positive and significant relationship between the size of the board of directors and the performance of banks 
in Kosovo, so alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The result of this hypothesis is in accordance with the 
findings of the research performed by Isik-Nice (2016),                Mateu-Belaj (2016), Adams (2011), but 
contradicts with the findings of authors Dogan (2013), Boussaada & Karmani (2015). 
 
Regarding the control variables included in the regression analysis, model 1a shows a significant positive 
impact between bank size (MB) (r = 2.64e-7, p = 0.0138) and ROA, which implies that an increase in bank 
size, will affect the bank's financial performance, in terms of ROA. Also, the results show a significant negative 
impact on total deposits (D) (r = -3.35e-7, p = 0.0104) and ROA, which implies that an increase in total 
deposits will negatively affect the ROA due to increased interest expense and the costs associated with 
holding the deposits. Other control variables such as credit risk (RRK) and liquidity risk (RRL) have shown 
positive relationships with ROA, but their effect is not significant (p = 0.0529 and p = 0.9468). Similar results 
were also noted in model 1b, where a significant positive impact was observed between the bank size (r = 
2.64e-6, p = 0.0040) and ROE, and the credit risk (r = 1.1861, p = 0.0293), while a significant negative impact 
was observed between total deposits (r = 3.06e-6, p = 0.0038) and ROE. With regard to liquidity risk (RRL) 
(r = 0.01662, p = 0.6781), the impact on ROE is positive and not significant. 
 
The coefficient R2 of model 1a is 0.3712, while model 1b is 0.7333, meaning that model 1a has the ability to 
explain 37.12% of changes in ROA of commercial banks in Kosovo, while model 1b has the ability to explain 
for 73.33% of changes in ROE of commercial banks in Kosovo. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant positive relationship between the independence of the board of 
directors and the performance of banks in Kosovo. 
 
This hypothesis is tested by model 2a and model 2b specified in the econometric section. Model 2a is used 
to test the impact of the independence of board of directors on the financial performance of commercial banks 
in Kosovo over the period 2006-2017 expressed through ROA, while model 2b is used to test the same 
impact but through ROE as a dependent variable. 
 
The regression results presented in tables 6 show a significant and positive influence between the 
independence of the Board of Directors (PABD) and the financial performance of commercial banks in 
Kosovo expressed through ROA and ROE. According to model 2a, which applies ROA as performance 
measure, the regression coefficient is r = 0.0525 with a confidence level of p = 0.0029 (p≤1%). Also, 
according to model 2b, which applies ROE as performance measure, the regression coefficient is r = 0.3512 
with a confidence level of p = 0.0148 (p≤5%). This implies that the independence of the board of directors, 
i.e. the level of non-executive (external) directors, has a significant positive impact on the ROA and ROE of 
commercial banks in Kosovo, and that an increase in this variable would have an increasing impact on 
performance of banks, respectively, in the growth of ROA and ROE. This may be due to the fact that external 
directors may have greater expertise and are more objective, professional and independent during the 
decision-making process. This result rejects the zero hypothesis (H0), where it is foreseen that there is no 
positive and significant relationship between the independence of the board of directors and the performance 
of banks in Kosovo, so alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. The result of this hypothesis is in accordance 
with the research findings of authors Delis et.al (2010), Boussaada dhe Karmani (2015), Mateu-Belhaj 
(2016), Adams (2011), but contradicts with the findings of authors Ozcan (2016) and Al-Baidhani (2015). 
 
Regarding the control variables included in the regression analysis, model 2a shows a significant positive 
relationship between the bank size (r = 2.06e-7, p = 0.0084) and ROA, which implies that an increase in bank 
size, will affect the bank's financial performance (ROA). Other control variables such as credit risk (RRK) and 
liquidity risk (RRL) have shown positive relationships with ROA, but their effect is not significant (p = 0.1511 
and p = 0.4552), while deposits (D) have shown negative and not significant results (r = -2.34e-7, p = 0.1052). 
Similar results were also noted in model 2b, where a significant positive impact was observed between the 
bank's size and ROE (r = 2.01e-6, p = 0.0421), while the non-significant positive effect was observed between 
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credit risk (r = 0.9932, p = 0.1115) and ROE as well as liquidity risk (r = 0.0494, p = 0.2818) and ROE, while 
non-significant negative impact was observed also between deposits (r = -2.23e-6, p = 0.0626) and ROE. 
 
The coefficient R2 of model 2a is 0.1894 while model 2b is 0.6421, which means that model 2a has the ability 
to explain 18.94% of changes in ROA of commercial banks in Kosovo, while model 2b has the ability to 
account for 64.21% of changes in bank ROE commercial in Kosovo. 
 
Table 6: Fixed effect (FE) multiple regression panel data results – ROA and ROE 
as dependent variable 
 
 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b 
R2 0.4545 0.2968 0.7687 0.6895 
R2 (adjusted) 0.3712 0.1894 0.7333 0.6421 
Statistic-F 5.4552 12.763 21.754 14.540 
Significance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
MBD R 
    Sig 
0.0047** 
0.0000 
- 
- 
0.0386** 
0.0000 
- 
- 
PABD R 
    Sig 
- 
- 
0.0525** 
0.0029 
- 
- 
0.3512* 
0.0148 
MB R 
  Sig 
2.64e-7* 
0.0138 
2.06e-7** 
0.0084 
2.64e-6** 
0.0040 
2.01e-6* 
0.0421 
RRK R 
  Sig 
0.1299 
0.0529 
0.1084 
0.1511 
1.1861* 
0.0293 
0.99324 
0.1115 
D R 
  Sig 
-3.35e-7* 
0.0104 
-2.34e-7 
0.1052 
-3.0e-6** 
0.0038 
-2.23e-6 
0.0626 
RRL R 
  Sig 
0.0003 
0.9468 
0.0041 
0.4552 
0.01662 
0.6781 
0.0494 
0.2818 
Source: author (Eviews 10.0); *0.05 (5%); ** 0.01 (1%); 
Conclusions 
The main purpose of this research was to analyze and study the relationship between the corporate 
governance metrics such as board size and board independence and its impact on financial performance of 
the banking sector in Kosovo during the period 2006-2017. The following are the main findings of the research 
regarding the impact of the Board of Directors on the financial performance of the banking sector in Kosovo. 
The findings were analyzed for five (2) independent variables of the board of directors. In addition to 
discussing the findings, this section will also list the recommendations according to the findings of the 
research. Based on the descriptive analysis, it has been identified that the average size of the board of 
directors of banks in Kosovo during the time period 2006-2017 is 5, with a maximum number of 8 and a 
minimum of 4. Also, based on the results of the multiple regression panel data is confirmed that the board of 
directors size has had a positive and significant impact on banks' financial performance in Kosovo, hence, 
this variable should be considered as an important variable for the banking system in Kosovo. The size of 
the boards of Kosovo banks can be considered as small as, according to Coleman and Biekpe's suggestions, 
the optimum level of board of directors for a bank varies from 11 to 15 (Biekpe, 2018). The results of other 
authors' research suggest that boards (above 11-15 members) are considered to be less effective, efficient 
and the level of co-ordination of decisions is more difficult. Therefore, based on the findings of this research, 
it is recommended that the level of the board of directors of the banking sector in Kosovo should not exceed 
11, i.e. not become 'large boards', which are considered not to have a positive impact on banks' financial 
performance. 
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Based on the descriptive analysis, it has been identified that the average value of the independence of the 
board of directors of banks in Kosovo during the time period 2006-2017 is 50.2%, which means that half of 
the board members of commercial banks in Kosovo are non-executive (external) while the other half are 
internal director (executive). Also, based on the results of the multiple regression panel data, it has been 
concluded that the independence of the board of directors has had a positive and significant impact on banks' 
financial performance, hence, this variable should be considered as an important variable for the banking 
system in Kosovo. Based on previous research by various authors, a high level of participation of external 
(non-executive) directors may not have such a positive effect on the banks and may not affect performance 
improvement, while the participation of a number of internal directors can have a positive impact. However, 
according to Baysinger & Butler (1985), Ozcan (2016), an optimal board should have a sufficient mix between 
executive and non-executive directors, as each party brings skills and expertise in the process of monitoring 
and supervising the bank's management. Therefore, based on the findings of this research, it is 
recommended that the level of non-executive (external) directors of the banking sector in Kosovo remain at 
the current level of 50%, as a very high number may not have such beneficial effects on banks in Kosovo. 
 
Like any other research, this research may also have many limitations that are listed below and which should 
be taken into account when evaluating the findings of the research: 
• The ROA and ROE are used as a benchmark for bank performance. During the literature review phase, 
it has been noted that there are other performance measures that could have been used as dependent 
variables of this research, such as return on investment (ROI) and net interest margin (NIM). Therefore, 
if other performance measures were taken into account in the research, the results and 
recommendations could have been different, and therefore the results of the current research should be 
interpreted in the light of this limitation. 
• The average number of commercial banks during the research period 2006-2017 is seven (7) and the 
number of analyzed variables is 15, resulting in 1260 total observations. However, the results would have 
been more powerful if the analysis would involve a larger number of banks, i.e., all the banks in the 
Western Balkans region. 
• The research period is limited to twelve years (12 years), which can be considered as a sufficient time 
period for similar studies. However, a larger period of study would result in more powerful findings. It 
should be noted that the current research period is above the average of the periods investigated by 
other authors of this field. 
• Only 2 independent Board of Directors and 4 control variables were taken into account. The research 
does not address other factors that may have had an impact on banks' financial performance, such as 
cost efficiency, inflation, gross domestic product (GDP), risk index, credit protocols composition, gender 
diversity of board members, etc. Therefore, future researchers can include these internal and external 
factors as well as other control variables. 
 
Prospective researchers in this field can take into account the above specified limitations of this research 
and incorporate them into their research. Following are some of the proposals for further research in this 
area.  
(i) Future researchers, as a variable for measuring the performance of commercial banks, except for 
ROA and ROE, can also use other coefficients such as return on investment (ROI) and net interest 
margin (NIM). (ii) Sample size is considered to be taken across the region so that the results are more 
robust and comparable between countries, e.g., 'the impact of the board of directors in banks of the 
Western Balkans countries.  
(iii) The research period should be taken for at least 15 years, so that the phenomenon is followed for a 
longer period and the results are more reliable and statistically more significant.  
(iv) The control variables may include other factors that may have an impact on the performance of 
banks, including external factors and internal factors such as cost efficiency, inflation, gross domestic 
product (GDP) the risk index, the composition of the credit portfolio, etc. 
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